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FISCAL POLICYA lively debate is underway about replacing Canada’s 2 percent inflation target with a target for
lower inflation or a target for the price level itself when Canada’s inflation-control arrangement
expires at the end of 2011. Either change could reduce uncertainty about changes in the value of
money over time, and potentially stabilize the economy as well. But such policies may involve
costs; a long-standing concern is that rises versus falls in the price level may have different or
asymmetrical impacts on the economy.
The authors examine a set of asymmetries that have up to now received no attention, but may
have large impacts on taxpayers, transfer recipients, and government budgets – inflation-indexed
government programs in which transfer payments and tax parameters increase when the
Consumer Price Index rises but do not decline when it falls. 
They find an important implication of these asymmetries is that the real value of seniors’ benefits
and government pensions would be higher over potentially long intervals under monetary-policy
regimes that produce lower inflation or stable prices. The impact on the Personal Income Tax, the
Canada Child Tax Benefit and the GST/HST credit is even larger because key thresholds and
transfers in these programs ratchet up permanently in real terms during deflations. 
The authors argue the rigidities and asymmetries associated with these programs should not be an
obstacle to a change in the Bank of Canada’s target that seems justified for other reasons. They
should rather be seen as problems to be solved. One solution would be for the federal
government, when the Bank of Canada adopts a new set of targets, to initiate changes to make all
indexed programs respond symmetrically to changes in the CPI.
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C
anada’s current inflation-
control arrangement runs out
at the end of 2011, and the
debate about what to do afterwards
has become lively. We could simply
adopt another multi-year target for 2
percent annual inflation by extending
the current regime. We could adopt a
lower target for annual increases in
the consumer price index (CPI) under
that regime. Or we could move to
price-level targeting and adopt a
target path for the price level itself –
possibly asking the Bank of Canada
to make it rise 2 percent annually, or
by a smaller amount, or not at all.
A lower target for inflation or a price-level
target that produced a trend for the inflation rate
that was less than 2 percent could improve well-
being by reducing uncertainty about changes in
the value of money over time, potentially stabilizing
the economy as well.
1 But such policies may
involve costs; a long-standing concern is that rises
versus falls in the price level may have different or
asymmetrical impacts on the economy. 
This Backgrounder looks at a set of such
asymmetries: inflation-indexed government
programs in which transfer payments and tax
parameters increase when the CPI rises but do not
decline when it falls. To the extent that lower
inflation or price-level targeting would lead to
more frequent, longer, or larger drops in the CPI,
a new regime might produce large, arbitrary
transfers of wealth unless it were accompanied by
changes to personal income taxes, transfers, and
indexed pensions to make these programs respond
symmetrically to price-level changes.
Potential Asymmetrical Economic
Responses to Inflation 
The drawbacks of low or zero inflation in the
presence of asymmetries is a well-explored topic.
One concern is that people may dislike cuts in
nominal wages, making real-wage declines –
needed to shift resources among sectors or avoid
unemployment – harder to achieve in a low-inflation
environment (Fortin et al. 2002). Another
concern is that many interest-bearing instruments
cannot have negative yields and that nominal
interest rates that cannot fall below zero may
impede the operation of monetary policy (Bank of
Canada 2006).
To the extent that rigidities in the labour market
matter, however, they are a specific example of
“money illusion.”
2 If money illusion is a major
problem, low inflation or zero inflation confers
pervasive offsetting benefits in all markets – for
goods, services, and capital, as well as labour.
Actual experience with low inflation, moreover,
has shown that any such rigidities are not
decisively damaging, even in the labour market;
until the recent slump, Canada’s unemployment
rate declined steadily during 13 years of 2 percent
inflation targeting. As for the zero floor under
nominal interest rates, the Bank of Canada and
other central banks hit that limit with their policy
rates in early 2009. Notwithstanding the technical
and political problems this environment has
created for the US Federal Reserve, experience
elsewhere shows that it does not preclude rebounds
in money, credit, spending, and output.
We thank Colin Busby, David Laidler, Alexandre Laurin and Chris Ragan for comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for any errors and
for the conclusions is ours alone.
1 Laidler (2010), in his introductory essay, presents an overview of the issues surrounding the adoption of a monetary-policy regime with a
lower inflation target and/or a price-level target. As Laidler notes, under a price-level targeting regime, “…the Bank of Canada would not
merely seek to restore inflation to a target value after a shock, but would undo the effects of that shock on the price level itself.” (p.7) In
contrast, under inflation-targeting, past deviations from target are treated as bygones. For more information on the merits of such policy
regimes, see for example Ambler (2009), Boivin (2009), Parkin (2009), and Robson (2009). 
2 The illusion in this case is that workers object to pay cuts, not realizing that proportional price declines for the things they buy may keep
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Less well explored are policy instruments that
respond asymmetrically to rises and falls in the
price level. This neglect may be partly because
instances of deflation – situations where the
overall level of prices is declining, rather than
individual prices – have seemed less relevant to
discussions of choices among targets for positive
overall inflation rates, and are only coming into
sharper focus now that targeting inflation at low
levels has proved feasible and the possibility of
going lower yet has become more interesting.
Another likely reason is that taxes, transfers, and
contracts vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and are thus harder for investigators to model in
any universally applicable way.
3 Notwithstanding
this neglect in the literature, program parameters
that do not treat these movements symmetrically
may matter. They do in Canada, as we detail in
the next section.
Inflation-Linked Programs in Canada 
Many Canadian programs have asymmetrical
indexation. We focus here on three categories of
federal-government programs (summarized in 
Table 1), but note that many programs in
provincial or shared jurisdiction, such as the Canada
Pension Plan, share some of these characteristics,
and that the economy-wide impacts of moving to
regimes that produce lower or zero inflation
without making them symmetrical will be larger
than the ones we document in this paper.
Seniors’ Benefits 
The federal government provides a number of
benefits to seniors. The two most important in
dollar terms are Old Age Security (OAS) and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), with
income-tested allowances for spouses and
survivors making up the rest. Payments under
these programs amounted to $34.7 billion in the
2009/10 fiscal year.
The legislation governing these payments
indexes benefits quarterly to increases in the CPI.
In the event that the quarterly average of the CPI
falls from one quarter to the next, however, the
legislation specifies that the dollar value of the
pension will not decline but will instead stay
constant until the quarterly average rises above the
previous peak again.
The Personal Income Tax 
The federal Personal Income Tax (PIT) adjusts
most parameters used in calculating net federal
personal taxes annually to reflect inflation.
4 In
terms of fiscal impact, the key provisions are the
personal and the married or common-law
amounts and the thresholds at which tax rates rise.
Myriad other provisions, such as the age credit,
the employment credit, the adoption credit, the
public transit credit, the credit for mental or
physical impairment, refundable medical
expenses, the Working Income Tax Benefit
(WITB), the tax on Old Age Security benefits, the
deduction for tradesperson’s tools, and the
allowance for board and lodging are also indexed
to the CPI.
These adjustments are not symmetrical,
however. While the relevant amounts increase
when the CPI rises, they do not decline when it
falls. They differ from the transfers to seniors just
discussed, though, in that they make no reference
to the price level at all: they respond to inflation
but not to deflation. So the downward movements
in the indexation factor are not “carried forward”
to reduce future increases. The PIT parameters
resume rising when the CPI does. So deflations
ratchet their real value upward, putting people
into lower tax brackets than they would otherwise
3 The inflation-indexed bonds of the US federal government, for example, cannot mature at less than their face value, which creates a
potentially important transfer of wealth in the event of deflation; in Canada, by contrast, the principal value of the federal government’s real
return bonds responds symmetrically to price movements in either direction.
4 Amounts for each taxation year rise in line with the increase in the CPI, averaged over the 12 months to the previous September, compared
to the same 12-month period of the prior taxation year.Commentary 322 | 3
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be in and lowering their tax payments and federal
revenues. Total federal PIT collected in 2009/10
was $103.99 billion.
The Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) and the
Goods and Services Tax/Harmonized Sales Tax
(GST/HST) Credit are transfer payments also
governed by the Income Tax Act. The CCTB
provides a geared-to-income monthly payment to
low- and modest-income families with children
under age 18; payments under this program were
$9.8 billion in 2009/10. The GST/HST Credit,
despite its name, is not related to sales taxes paid,
but is a geared-to-income transfer; payments in
2009/10 came to $3.7 billion.
The CCTB and the GST/HST Credit are also
downwardly rigid: that is, they rise if the year-
over-year change in the CPI is positive in the
reference period but do not decline if it is negative.
Like the other PIT parameters, they ignore
declines completely and (unlike the seniors’
benefits) begin rising again when the CPI does. So
temporary deflations also ratchet these transfers
up in real terms.
Federal Government Pensions 
The federal government sponsors pension plans
that pay annuities indexed to inflation. Under
these plans, benefits accrue according to an
employee’s length of service and final five years’
salary; once the person is retired and the benefits
are being paid, they are subject to annual
adjustment with reference to the CPI.
5
Sources: Old Age Security Act, Income Tax Act, Public Service Superannuation Act, Supplementary Retirement Benefits Act, Canadian Forces
Superannuation Act, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act. 
Table 1: Selected Examples of Asymmetrical Treatment of Inflation in Federal Government Programs
5 The indexation factor for the annuities is the same as that for the PIT: the average CPI over the 12 months ending the previous September,
compared to the same period a year earlier.
Legislation
Affected Transfers 
or Tax Parameters 
Type of Asymmetry
or Rigidity
Old Age Security Act
Old Age Security Pension;
Guaranteed Income Supplement;
Allowances for spouses 
and survivors.
Quarterly CPI adjustments of benefits
cannot be negative, and benefit 
levels are held constant until such
time as the quarterly average of the
CPI rises above the previous peak.
Income Tax Act
Most tax-rate thresholds and
credits, CCTB, GST/HST credit.
Annual CPI adjustments of amounts
cannot be negative from one period
to the next. Downward movements
in the indexation factor are not “carried
forward” to reduce future increases.
Public Service Superannuation
Act, Supplementary Retirement
Benefits Act, Canadian Forces
Superannuation Act and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police
Superannuation Act
Pension payments under federal
government’s pension plans.
Annual CPI adjustments of pension
amounts cannot be negative. The
decline in the CPI creates a carry-
forward that diminishes the next 




















Figure 1: Programs with Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Indexation: A Stylized Example 
Source: Authors’ calculations
The indexation of the annuities is also not
symmetrical. If the CPI declines during the
reference period, benefits do not decrease for that
year. A decline in the CPI, however, does create a
carry-forward – in similar fashion to the OAS
(although over an annual rather than a quarterly
time period) – in that the next positive adjustment
diminishes accordingly. In the 2009/10 fiscal year,
annuities paid by the federal government under
these plans amounted to $8.3 billion.
A Stylized Example: To clarify how these
asymmetries work, and how the provisions with
carry-forwards differ from those that ratchet up,
Figure 1 shows a stylized scenario. In it, a central
bank has a target to keep the price level stable over
time; while it succeeds on average, mistakes and
events beyond its control move the CPI above and
below the target from year to year. The three lines
in the chart show the value of three government
programs or tax parameters, all of which are worth
$1.00 in the base year, but are indexed to the CPI
in different ways: 
￿ The solid line represents the value over time of a
program that is symmetrically indexed. It tracks
the CPI exactly, increasing when the CPI rises and
decreasing when the CPI falls, and ending the
period at $1.00, when the CPI is back at its
starting value. 
￿ The dashed line represents the value of a
government program that, like the OAS, precludes
decreases when the CPI falls, but has carry-forward
provisions that reduce subsequent increases. It rises
with each peak in the CPI and then hangs there
until such time as the CPI surpasses that peak, so
in this scenario, it ends the period at its highest
value during the period: $1.10. 
￿ The dotted line represents the value of a program
that, like the PIT parameters, does not decrease
when the CPI falls and always increases when the
CPI rises – the ratchet effect. It rises in real terms
with every dip and rebound in the CPI: in this
| 4 Commentary 322Commentary 322 | 5
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scenario, it ends the period at $1.25, and it would
continue to rise as the CPI fluctuates in the future.
Although the actual features of Canadian
programs and tax parameters affect the way these
features play out in real life, this simple example
captures their essential provisions.
6
The Significance of Asymmetries in
Inflation-Linked Programs 
How important these asymmetries might be in an
environment of lower inflation or price-level
targets depends on the trend inflation rate the
target produces, and the size and duration of
deviations from it. The transfers and programs
with carry-forward provisions will overpay in real
terms between the beginning of a deflationary
period and the time the CPI returns to its pre-
deflation level. This effect could be trivial if
deflations are few, small, and short but will be
important if they are frequent, large, and long.
Likewise, the provisions that ignore deflations will
ratchet up in real terms only by trivial amounts if
deflations are rare and small, but by significant
amounts if they are frequent and large.
7
Potential Periods of Deflation with Lower Price-
Level Targets 
Our first step in this investigation is to invent
some scenarios in which the Bank of Canada
either adopted a lower inflation target – the same
regime that it has now but with a number lower
than 2 percent – or a price-level target in which
the average increase in the price level was lower
than 2 percent. Those scenarios will give some
guide about how frequent, large, and long
deflations might be under alternative regimes.
The recent period in which the Bank of Canada
has targeted 2 percent inflation gives us a head
start on these scenarios. Until late 2010, the Bank
held inflation so remarkably close to its target that
between December 1995, when the 2 percent
target first became effective, and December 2010,
the average compound annual increase in the CPI
was 1.9 percent. 
We acknowledge that the CPI might have
behaved differently if the Bank’s goal had actually
been a 2 percent annualized increase in the level of
the CPI. For instance, such a target, once it had
become credible, might have stabilized the price
level around the 2 percent trend, since individuals
and businesses might have set prices in anticipation
of the index’s returning to trend after deviations.
The closeness with which the actual CPI tracked a
2 percent trend over that period nevertheless
seems to us to make it reasonable to adopt as a
working assumption that the post-1995 experience
is probably not much different from what
Canadians would have seen if the Bank had
actually had a 2 percent target for increases in the
price level itself.
8
Our second simplifying assumption is that even
if the target for inflation or for the trend increase
in the CPI had been different since 1995,
variations in the CPI around its trend since 1995
would have been essentially the same. This also
might not be true, but various considerations –
such as some of the asymmetries in personal or
6 To keep the illustration simple, we omit the multiplicative effect of percent changes on a rising base. The actual effect of asymmetries is
larger to the extent that each percent change is calculated from a higher previous level of the CPI – an effect that would be trivial in this
illustration, but would matter more when fluctuations are large and the time horizon extends.
7 A related issue that we note but do not pursue here is the potential impact of improvements in the CPI that might reduce an upward bias of
some 0.5-0.6 percent annually described by several investigations (Crawford 1998; Rossiter 2005). If methodological improvements reduced
this bias, the Bank of Canada’s inflation target should come down too in order to avoid increases in actual inflation (Ragan 2011; Melino
2011). Programs indexed to the CPI – which would historically have overcompensated for inflation by the amount of the bias – would also
rise by less, and instances where their parameters fail to respond symmetrically to decreases in the CPI would become more important. This
problem would be solved by the measures recommended in this study to make these programs respond symmetrically to CPI changes in
either direction. 
8 The increases in the CPI were so close to a 2 percent annual trend that some observers wondered if the Bank of Canada was actually aiming
at that result – that is, was a “closet” price-level targeter. As Melino (2011) points out, when inflation targeting central banks move their
policy interest rate only in small increments – a preference of most central banks, including the Bank of Canada – the result will resemble
price-level targeting more closely than pure forward-looking inflation targeting would.| 6 Commentary 322
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institutional behaviour mentioned earlier on the
one hand or greater confidence in a lower target
on the other – might justify  an assumption of
either more or less variability. For those reasons,
we think it reasonable to use the CPI’s actual
behaviour from December 1995 to September
2010 as a guide to its behaviour with different
targets for inflation or trends in the CPI.
We therefore use the CPI trends shown in
Figure 2 to run some alternative scenarios. In two
of them, the Bank had targeted either 1 percent
inflation or a 1 percent annualized trend increase
in the price level – which, given our assumption
about the same variability either way, collapse into
the line labelled “1 percent scenarios.” In the
other two, the Bank had targeted either no
inflation or an unchanging price level – which
under our assumption about variability collapse
into the line labelled “0 percent scenarios.”
9 As
Figure 2 illustrates, actual experience over this
period – or the alternative implied by our first
assumption, namely, that  the Bank had targeted a
2 percent annualized trend increase in the CPI –
involved a handful of deflations, of which only the
episode that started in the summer of 2008 lasted
more than a couple of months. Under the 1
percent scenarios, deflations would have been
more numerous and protracted; and under the 0
percent scenarios, they would have occurred
roughly half the time, with periods when the CPI
was below previous peaks lasting for years.
10
Potential Fiscal Impacts of Lower 
Price-Level Targets
The number of periods since 1995 when the
asymmetries in government programs actually did
matter was very small. No deflation lasted long
enough to trigger the “no-decline” provisions of
the taxes and transfers under the PIT or of the
federal superannuation annuities, and the 10
quarters in which the price level was lower than in
a previous quarter produce only minor periods of
overpayment of seniors’ benefits. We now proceed
to calculate how often these provisions would
have mattered in our two alternative pairs of
scenarios: first, the ones in which the Bank’s target
had been either 1percent inflation or a 1 percent
increasing trend in the price level, and, second,
the ones in which its  target had been either zero
inflation or an unchanging CPI.
The idea is to replay history and see how these
tax parameters, transfers, and payments would
have developed under the current asymmetrical
system, compared to a system where they
responded symmetrically to movements in the
CPI in either direction. We depart from historical
figures in two respects. First, we benchmark to
current figures for the dollar values of various tax
provisions, transfers and payments, to produce
tallies that are more pertinent to discussion of
policy changes looking forward. We also benchmark
to current legislation and hence disregard
historical changes to indexation, again in an effort
to concentrate the discussion on forward looking
policy changes. If the legislation governing seniors’
benefits and the PIT had been the same but the
CPI had trended upward by 1 percent annually or
not at all, the federal government’s bottom line –
and, of course, the bottom lines of taxpayers and
recipients of these payments – would have differed
from what it would have been under symmetrical
indexation in several ways.
Overpayment of Seniors’ Benefits: Under the
current asymmetrical system, recipients of seniors’
benefits would have enjoyed material overpayments
during periods when the CPI, as calculated on a
9 The Bank of Canada’s inflation target did not actually become 2 percent year over year until December 1995, but since the Bank knew ahead
of time that that figure would be its target  and since monetary policy works with a lag, we begin this reconstruction in October 1994. That
month was in the midst of a 12-month period when the increase in the CPI averaged 2 percent, so nothing important hangs on this choice.
10 We recognize that this technique of replaying history with different price-level trends gives a more limited view of the significance of
asymmetries than, say, generating artificial price levels for longer periods of time to create scenarios that might be considered representative.
Modeling dynamic complex processes is an uncertain business, however, and would not necessarily yield more insight. In the particular case
of provisions with carryforwards under a zero-increase trend, for example, a great deal depends on the timing of the first large spike upward,
which will create overpayments for however long it takes before a larger spike drives them higher.Commentary 322 | 7
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Figure 2: Actual CPI Growth Path and Potential CPI Growth Paths under 1 Percent Inflation and 0
Percent Inflation Scenarios (Monthly)
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 326-0020, and authors’ calculations. 
quarterly basis, was below its previous peak.
Overpayments of OAS and GIS would have
occurred for 33 quarters under the 1 percent
scenarios and for 57 quarters – out of a total of 63
quarters – under the 0 percent scenarios. Figure 3
contrasts the payments in the 0 percent scenarios
with what would have occurred if seniors’ benefits
responded symmetrically to movements of the
CPI in either direction to keep their purchasing
power constant.
The overpayments we calculate would have had
important cost implications for the federal
government. Using the $34.7 billion paid under
these programs in 2009/10 as a starting point for
the financial tally in this alternative history, we
calculate the cumulative nominal-dollar overpayment
over the 15-year period to be $8.2 billion (some
$0.5 billion annually) under the 1 percent
scenarios and  to be $26.9 billion ($1.7 billion
annually) under the 0 percent scenarios.
Overinflation of Income Tax Parameters: Turning
to the PIT-linked parameters, we find that tax
thresholds under the current asymmetrical system
would have moved up in real terms at intervals,
ending the period some 0.4 percent above their
value with symmetrical indexation under the 1
percent scenarios, and some 5 percent above their
value with symmetrical indexation under the 0
percent scenarios. (Figure 4, like Figure 3,
illustrates the contrast for the latter scenarios.)
These real increases in value would have lessened
taxpayers’ liabilities compared to the situation
with symmetrical indexation and would have had
corresponding adverse impacts on the federal
treasury.
11 Under the 1 percent and 0 percent
scenarios, the CCTB and the GST/HST credit
would likewise have ended the period 0.4 percent
and 5.0 percent above their values with
symmetrical indexation, thereby benefiting
recipients at Ottawa’s expense.
11 Our calculations hold other factors constant and do not, for example, take into account the feedback – discretionary increases in taxes and
decreases in transfers, for example – such changes would likely have necessitated in the government’s overall fiscal policy.| 8 Commentary 322
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Benchmarking to current values of taxes and
transfers, we calculate a cumulative net benefit to
taxpayers and transfer recipients at the treasury’s
expense of $1.3 billion (an average of $0.1 billion
annually) over the period under the 1 percent
inflation scenarios.  Under the 0 percent scenarios,
with their more frequent and larger periods of
deflation, the cumulative impact of the upward
ratcheting in real values is much greater: $49.5
billion (an average of $3.3 billion annually).
12
Overpayment of Federal Pensions: A similar
exercise can be applied to federal employees’
pensions – which, as noted above, resemble
seniors’ benefits (but with annual rather than
quarterly adjustments) in that declines in the CPI
do not shrink the payments, but simply reduce
the next increase. The immediate result of this
asymmetry, compared to a situation where
symmetrical indexation kept the purchasing power
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Figure 3: Seniors’ Benefits with 0 Percent Inflation: Asymmetrical versus Symmetrical Indexation 
Source: Authors’ calculations
12 To perform the simulations we used Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M), version 18.0; responsibility
for the data and their interpretation lies with the authors. The following parameters are used in the simulations:  basic OAS, OAS phase-out
threshold, basic GIS – single, basic GIS – married, basic GIS portion of extended spouse’s allowance, Federal Sales Tax Credit amount for
filer, Federal Sales Tax Credit amount for spouse, Federal Sales Tax Credit amount for dependant, Federal Sales Tax Credit reduction level,
GST additional credit amount, GST additional credit exemption, basic child benefit (per child), supplement for third and subsequent
children, federal child benefits family income phase-out threshold, WIS/NCBS phase-out threshold, WIS/NCBS for first child, WIS/NCBS
for second child, WIS/NCBS for each additional child, federal tax table, basic personal exemption amount, married exemption amount, age
amount, age amount net income phase-out threshold, Canada Employment Credit, WITB amount for singles, WITB amount for couples
and  single parents, WITB family net income phase-out threshold, WITB single net income phase-out threshold, WITB supplement for
disabilities amount, WITB supplement for disabilities family net income phase-out threshold, and WITB supplement for disabilities single
net income phase-out threshold. Commentary 322 | 9
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Figure 4: Personal Income Tax Parameters with 0 Percent Inflation: Asymmetrical versus 
Symmetrical Indexation
Source: Authors’ calculations 
the pension plans. (Figure 5, like Figures 3 and 4,
illustrates the contrast under the 0 percent scenarios.
13) 
Benchmarking to annuity payments for
2009/10, we put the cumulative nominal
overpayment at $0.1 billion (an average of $6
million annually) under the 1 percent scenarios
and at $1 billion ($65 million annually) under the
0 percent scenarios.
Policy Implications 
Two responses to these facts and calculations are
possible. Some might see these asymmetries as
important entries on the cost side of the ledger
when evaluating the merits of moving to lower
inflation or price-level targets. Others may also see
them as a problem but argue that fixing them
would clear the way for a new monetary regime
that might be desirable for other reasons.
We would favour fixing the asymmetries. As
noted above, to the extent that money illusion,
which inspires different responses to increases and
decreases in prices, is a pervasive problem, the case
for lower or zero inflation may actually be stronger.
Building such provisions into taxes and transfers
may have seemed unremarkable at a time when
chronic inflation appeared to be an inevitable part
of the economic landscape and wage and price
declines were rare, but times have changed. The
intent of indexation is to ensure that key taxes and
13 Again, we emphasize that this calculation is partial. Increases in liabilities under the pension plans would eventually have other effects –
higher contributions from current employees or the government as their employer, tax-funded bailouts, or even lower benefits for 
future recipients.| 10 Commentary 322
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Figure 5: CPI-Linked Adjustment of Federal Pension Annuities under 0 Percent Inflation Scenarios 
Source: Authors’ calculations
transfers stay the same in real terms: in the case of
transfers, for example, indexation is intended to
ensure constant purchasing power. Responding to
declines in the CPI with a delay or not responding
at all undermines this intent. In a low or zero
inflation environment, what appeared a harmless
concession to money illusion in an inflationary
environment produces temporary or even
permanent changes in the real amount of taxes
paid and transfers received – changes that have no
conceivable public purpose.
The solutions are straightforward: amend the
relevant legislation to make these programs and
tax parameters respond symmetrically to changes
in the CPI in both directions. If resistance to
dollar declines in PIT-related transfers or tax
thresholds appears an overwhelming obstacle to
complete symmetry when the inflation target is
above zero, there could be carry-forwards similar
to those that currently apply to seniors’ benefits
and federal employee pensions, with upward
indexation resuming only after the CPI has
regained its prior peak. When the target is zero
inflation or price stability, however, that half
measure would still result in chronic misalignments
in real terms, since the parameters would always
“stick” at the CPI’s latest peak. These misalignments,
to repeat, have no economic or policy justification.
Straightforward adaptation to CPI changes in
both directions is a preferable course.
Conclusion 
The debate about replacing Canada’s 2 percent
inflation target with a target for lower inflation or
for a trend in the price level has not been settled.
Several programs and the PIT have characteristics
that, if unchanged, should affect this decision,
because they do not respond symmetrically to
changes in the price level. An importantCommentary 322 | 11
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implication of these asymmetries is that the real
value of seniors’ benefits and government pensions
would be higher over potentially long intervals
under regimes whose target was lower inflation or
stable prices. The impact on the PIT and the
CCTB and the GST/HST credit is even larger
because these programs ratchet up permanently in
real terms during deflations. Although our
investigation focuses on federal taxes and
programs, these effects matter for other levels of
government as well.
Over the period of 2 percent inflation targeting
from the end of 1995 to the present, these
asymmetries have had little effect. Although we
rely on this history in illustrating how they might
matter more if the Bank of Canada produced
lower, or no, inflation, 2008 may have marked the
end of the “great moderation” in economic cycles
that prevailed over most of that period. If that is
so, Canadians may experience more dramatic ups
and downs of the CPI even if the Bank of Canada
extends its 2 percent inflation target. These effects
would therefore be more important, making
changes that would make all indexed programs
respond symmetrically to changes in the CPI
desirable even without any change to the
inflation-targeting regime.
Changes to make indexed programs respond
symmetrically would be much more desirable if a
lower inflation target or a target for the price level
results in lower trend inflation or even stable
prices over time. In our opinion, the rigidities and
asymmetries associated with these programs should
not be an obstacle to a change in the Bank of
Canada’s target that seems justified for other
reasons. They should rather be seen as problems to
be solved. One solution would be for the federal
government, when the Bank of Canada adopts a
new set of targets, to initiate changes to make all
indexed programs respond symmetrically to
changes in the CPI. That solution would make the
release of background documentation before the
2012 federal budget, with a view to introducing
the necessary legislation as part of the
implementation of that budget, a timely initiative. | 12 Commentary 322
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